John Marshall and the Constitution, a Chronicle of the Supreme Court — John Shaqi
John Marshall and the Constitution, a Chronicle of the Supreme CourtCorwin, Edward Samuel
History
John Marshall and the Constitution, a Chronicle of the Supreme Court
Corwin, Edward Samuel
Constitutional history -- United States; Marshall, John, 1755-1835; United States. Supreme Court
¹ See Benton's Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, vol. II, pp.
665-68. Marshall expressed the opinion in private that the repealing act
was "operative in depriving the judges of all power derived from the act
repealed" but not their office, "which is a mere capacity, without new
appointment, to receive and exercise any new judicial power which the
legislature may confer." Quoted by W. S. Carpenter in American Political
Science Review, vol. IX, p. 528.
At this point in Marshall's handling of the case the consummate debater
came to the assistance of the political strategist. Every one of his
arguments in this opinion in support of judicial review will be found
anticipated in the debate on the Repeal Act. What Marshall did was to
gather these arguments together, winnow them of their trivialities,
inconsistencies, and irrelevancies, and compress the residuum into a
compact presentation of the case which marches to its conclusion with
all the precision of a demonstration from Euclid.
The salient passages of this part of his opinion are the following:
[In the United States] the powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what
purpose is that limitation committed in writing if these limits may, at
any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction
between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if
those limits do not confine the persons on which they are imposed, and
if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a
proposition too plain to be contested: that the Constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the Constitution by an ordinary act.
[If, then,] an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is
void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and
oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law,
does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be
to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at
first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however,
receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law
be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the
Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution,
or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of
the very essence of judicial duty.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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