I have always regretted that I left the regiment even on so important a mission. At the time, I supposed it was only to be for a moment, and that with three field officers on duty I could be spared. As for the regiment, we succeeded so very much better later in the war, that we have not been in the habit of making great claims for the part we took in Antietam. Many other Union regiments fought longer, struggled harder, did more effective service and lost more men than we. The Confederates opposed to us appeared to be equal to us in numbers and they were superior in experience and all that experience gives. On all other fields, from the beginning to the end of our long service, we never had to face their equals. Everybody knows that troops fighting under the eye of Stonewall Jackson, and directed by Hood, were a terrible foe. Our particular opponents were all good marksmen, and the constant call of their officers, "Aim low," appeared to us entirely unnecessary. It was an awful morning; our comrades went down one after another with a most disheartening frequency, pierced with bullets from men who were half concealed, or who dodged quickly back to a safe cover the moment they fired. We think it was enough for us to "hold our own" till Greene's men swept in with their "terrible and overwhelming attack."[21] From all this story, I hope the reader will see why the wounding of Gen. Mansfield, which is the all important part in this narrative, is only a secondary matter to the men of the Tenth Maine Regiment, and why misrepresentations and errors have gone undisputed so many years. We never considered it our business to set history aright, until we saw that _our_ testimony was discredited and found our statement of fact treated as only one of the many stories of the wagon-drivers of Sharpsburg. EXPLANATION OF THE MAP. The following map is based upon one issued November, 1894, by the "Antietam Board." This in turn was based upon the so-called "Michler" map from the office of the U. S. Engineers, which, while correct in the main, has many errors of detail, and it is not likely that all of them have yet been discovered by the Board. Indeed, one object of the Board in issuing the map, was to invite criticism and corrections from the soldiers and others. The positions of the troops cannot be shown with anything like accuracy and clearness on so small a map, and are omitted excepting a few needed to illustrate the narrative, but it may be said in a general way, that just before Gen. Mansfield was wounded, the Union forces, under Hooker, were pushed out of "the great cornfield" and the East Woods. The 12th Corps, (Mansfield's), with some help from the remnants of the 1st Corps (Hooker's), stopped the advance of the Confederates under Hood, and in turn drove them back to West Woods.