The 10th Maine was guided by Gen. Mansfield in person. We had all seen him for some time previous sitting on his horse at the northwest corner of the East Wood, marked W on the map. He hurried us, first to the front, down hill through a field where several piles of stone lay, the Smoketown road still being on our left. We barely entered the "ten acre cornfield" when Mansfield beckoned us to move to our left. We then marched a few steps by what the tactics call "Left oblique," but did not gain ground to the left sufficiently to suit the General, so Col. Beal commanded "Left flank," whereupon each man faced east, and we presently knocked over the two fences of the Smoketown road and marched into Sam Poffenberger's field. While going across the Smoketown road Gen. Hooker rode from the woods (M) and told Col. Beal "The enemy are breaking through my lines; you must hold these woods," (meaning East Woods.) After crossing the road, bullets from the enemy began to whiz over and around us. When well into Sam Poffenberger's field the Colonel commanded "Right flank," then each man again faced south (or west of south to be more exact) and we all marched straight for the enemy, whom some of us could see in the woods, close to where our Mansfield marker is now standing, marked M on the map. The 10th Maine was in "double column at half distance" (or "double column in mass," as some remember.) [Illustration] Each line in the diagram represents about 15 men all facing "front." In this order we had bivouacked and marched to Sam Poffenberger's field, only that while in the ten acre corn field every man turned on his left heel and marched toward what had been the "left," until arriving in Sam Poffenberger's field, where a turn of each man to his right, or the technical "front," brought us to our original position. Apparently fifty to a hundred Confederates were strung along the fence (M) firing at us. They had the immense advantage that they could rest their rifles on the fence and fire into us, massed ten ranks deep, while we could only march and "take it." It was high time to deploy,[7] and Col. Beal proposed to do so, but Gen. Mansfield said "No," and remarked that a regiment can be easier handled "in mass" than "in line"; which is very true in the abstract. Gen. Mansfield then rode away, and Col. Beal, hardly waiting for him to get out of sight, ordered the regiment to deploy in double quick time. Everybody felt the need of haste.