Journal of a Cavalry Officer; Including the Memorable Sikh Campaign of 1845-1846Humbley, W. W. W. (William Wellington Waterloo)
History
Journal of a Cavalry Officer; Including the Memorable Sikh Campaign of 1845-1846
Humbley, W. W. W. (William Wellington Waterloo)
India -- Description and travel; Sikh War, 1845-1846
There were two officers, however, of great political talent, whose
official position enabled them to know more of the feelings of the
Sikhs, and of the probability of such a step than most others; one was
Major G. Broadfoot of the 34th Madras Native Infantry, who had held
the office of British Agent for Sikh affairs since November 1844, and
who had acted as engineer in the celebrated defence of Jellalabad,
the heroes of which obtained the well merited Roman distinction of a
mural crown; the other was Captain P. Nicolson, 28th Bengal Native
Infantry who had been appointed his assistant. Captain Nicolson was in
Affghanistan in 1838-39, and was deputed to conduct the traitor Dost
Mahomed Khan to Calcutta, and afterwards to Saharunpore. This officer
had had seven years' experience of the politics of the Affghans and the
Sikhs. At this juncture he was with Major General Sir John H. Littler
at Ferozepore. He was in the daily receipt of intelligence from Lahore,
and knew that the Sikhs would cross, for he wrote to Calcutta on the
9th of October, 1845, that "he believed the Sikhs would cross." What!
because Major Broadfoot knew that the Sikhs had made an empty threat to
cross in 1843, was it therefore improbable, that, being encamped for
a long time, on the right bank of the Sutlej, menacing the Durbar at
Lahore, from whence they marched in defiance of their government and of
their chief, whom they compelled to join them, they would execute their
threat under these circumstances?
Major Broadfoot was the Governor-General's agent, and as such was the
officer to whom he looked for intelligence, Captain Nicolson was his
subordinate; the Major doubted the Captain's intelligence, because he
had received no other information to induce him to believe that the
rebellious and infatuated Khalsa (or royal) troops would dare to cross.
If they threatened to cross in 1843 without carrying that threat into
execution, why might they not do the same in 1845? But this was not
good logic; the inference was against him; because in 1843 they were
obedient to the Durbar, and in 1845 they acted in defiance of it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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