Journal of a Cavalry Officer; Including the Memorable Sikh Campaign of 1845-1846Humbley, W. W. W. (William Wellington Waterloo)
History
Journal of a Cavalry Officer; Including the Memorable Sikh Campaign of 1845-1846
Humbley, W. W. W. (William Wellington Waterloo)
India -- Description and travel; Sikh War, 1845-1846
Deceived by the promised support of Goolab, and buoyed up by exalted
notions of their own military prowess and discipline, as well as
animated by the desire of pillage, the Sikhs made sure of success.
Though they had never seen the British troops in battle, the Khalsa
soldiers considered themselves fully equal to contend against them.
There is no doubt, and it is necessary to make the remark in order
to account for the presumptuous conduct of the Sikhs, that our sad
reverses at Cabool in 1841, and our retreat in 1842, had greatly
affected the _prestige_ of the British military character. Just as
the failure of Lord Lake before Bhurtpore, in 1805, even after his
victories in 1803 and 1804, had left the impression on the minds of the
native princes, that we could not take forts.
Now the Sikhs under Runjeet Singh had defeated the Affghans under
Ajean Khan, the elder brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, at Noushera (half
way between Attock and Peshawur), in 1823. They imagined themselves
superior, as soldiers, to the Affghans, and knew that the latter had
defeated the British. They did not, however, bear in mind that our
troops were destroyed in the retreat by the frost and snow. Lady Sale
says, the first snow fell on the 26th of November. They, therefore,
argued thus:--They had beaten the Affghans, and the Affghans had
beaten the British; therefore the British were not invincible, and
might be overcome by Sikh troops.
The disturbed state of the Lahore government during the latter part of
the reign of Runjeet Singh, up to the present moment, had compelled the
British government to introduce various precautionary measures for the
protection of the British frontier, on a scale which was opposed to the
terms of the treaty of 1809. It is true that the British government
had recognised their boy-king, Dhuleep Singh, who had been proclaimed
by the army, but being of a naturally suspicious character, the Sikhs
considered themselves in danger of invasion, and resolved to anticipate
the British, and wage war, by crossing the Sutlej. They appointed
Lall Singh, prime minister, or vizier, and Tej Singh, an officer of
considerable talent and experience, commander-in-chief of the Sikh
forces.
The British government demanded an explanation of this movement, but
none being given, the Governor-General issued a proclamation,[13]
declaring all the possessions and territories of the Maharajah Dhuleep
Singh on the left bank of the Sutlej to be confiscated and annexed to
the British dominions; calling upon the inhabitants and their rulers
to second the British government, he assured all who were peaceably
disposed, of the protection of that government.
Thus the war was begun. The Sikhs, as we have seen, crossed the Sutlej
with their heavy artillery on the 13th, on the 14th, marched to
Ferozeshah, and, on the 18th, met the British forces, under the command
of Sir Hugh Gough.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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