It was in vain that frequent representations were made to the ministry at Lisbon on the subject; that the armament at Bayonne, and the refusal of Spain to forbid the passage of French troops through her territories, were pointed out. The Portuguese forces were marched to the sea-coast, as if they apprehended an invasion from England; thus leaving the kingdom defenceless on the land side, and the ports were shut against English commerce, by a proclamation, dated 20th October, 1807. But the importance of Portugal to England, as neutral ground, or, in the event of a French government in Spain, as a point whence to attack the great enemy, was such, that the resentment which at another time would certainly have been openly declared, was suppressed; but a strong squadron was always kept up off the coast, partly to watch the proceedings on shore, partly to prevent the Portuguese vessels from coming out of port, and joining the French and Spaniards. While this system of watchfulness was kept up in Europe, the English ministry was not less attentive to the designs of France on the South American colonies. As long as Spain and Portugal continued to pay the enormous price in money for their neutrality, which France had demanded, the views of Napoleon were better answered than they could have been by the possession of all their territory and all their colonies. But the moment in which they should become unable or unwilling to pay that price, would of course be that of aggression and invasion. So early as 1796, Mr. Pitt had contemplated the advantages that must arise to Britain from the possession of a port in South America, and particularly in the Rio de la Plata, nor did he ever afterwards lose sight of it. Some circumstances occurred in December, 1804, to draw his attention, particularly towards the subject, inasmuch as he had intelligence that France was about to attempt to seize on one of the Spanish settlements on the first opportunity. But we were then at peace with Spain, and however willing to prevent such an aggression on the part of France, and to assist General Miranda in his intended expedition to South America, it was impossible to co-operate with him, as he earnestly pressed the ministry to do, although the advantage to England of securing such a market for her manufactures was clearly perceived. Among the officers who had been most confidentially consulted by Mr. Pitt, on the practicability of obtaining a settlement on the La Plata, was Sir Home Popham; and it was probably his knowledge of the views so long entertained by that minister, that induced him to take the hazardous step, of leaving the Cape of Good Hope so soon after it had been occupied by the English forces, in 1806, and taking Buenos Ayres without orders to that effect. His immediate motive was, the intelligence he had procured, that the squadron of the French admiral, Guillaumez, had intentions of touching on the coast of Brazil, entering the La Plata,