And it is altogether beside the point to urge, as Kant does incessantly, that in the latter case the intelligence inferred is _infinite_; in the former only _finite_. All that the Design Argument undertakes to prove is that mind lies at the basis of nature. It is quite beyond its province to say whether this mind is finite or infinite; and thus Kant’s criticisms on p. 364 are somewhat wide of the mark. There is always a difficulty in any argument which tries to establish the operation of mind anywhere, for mind cannot be seen or touched or felt; but the difficulty is not peculiar to that particular form of argument with which theological interests are involved. The real plausibility of this objection arises from a vague idea, often present to us when we speak of _infinite_ wisdom or _infinite_ intelligence, namely that the epithet _infinite_ in some way alters the meaning of the attributes to which it is applied. But the truth is that the word _infinite_, when applied to wisdom or knowledge or any other intellectual or moral quality, can only properly have reference to the number of acts of wisdom or knowledge that we suppose to have been performed. The only sense in which we have any right to speak of _infinite_ wisdom is that it is that which performs an infinite number of wise acts. And so when we speak of infinite _intelligence_, we have not the slightest warrant, either in logic or in common sense, for supposing that such intelligence is not similar in kind to that finite intelligence which we know in man.