A judgement with _objective universal validity_ is also always valid subjectively; _i.e._ if the judgement holds for everything contained under a given concept, it holds also for every one who represents an object by means of this concept. But from a _subjective universal validity_, _i.e._ aesthetical and resting on no concept, we cannot infer that which is logical; because that kind of judgement does not extend to the Object. Hence the aesthetical universality which is ascribed to a judgement must be of a particular kind, because it does not unite the predicate of beauty with the concept of the _Object_, considered in its whole logical sphere, and yet extends it to the whole sphere of judging persons. In respect of logical quantity all judgements of taste are _singular_ judgements. For because I must refer the object immediately to my feeling of pleasure and pain, and that not by means of concepts, they cannot have the quantity of objective generally valid judgements. Nevertheless if the singular representation of the Object of the judgement of taste in accordance with the conditions determining the latter, were transformed by comparison into a concept, a logically universal judgement could result therefrom. _E.g._ I describe by a judgement of taste the rose, that I see, as beautiful. But the judgement which results from the comparison of several singular judgements, “Roses in general are beautiful” is no longer described simply as aesthetical, but as a logical judgement based on an aesthetical one. Again the judgement “The rose is pleasant” (to smell) is, although aesthetical and singular, not a judgement of Taste but of Sense. It is distinguished from the former by the fact that the judgement of Taste carries with it an _aesthetical quantity_ of universality, _i.e._ of validity for every one; which cannot be found in a judgement about the Pleasant. It is only judgements about the Good which--although they also determine satisfaction in an object,--have logical and not merely aesthetical universality; for they are valid of the Object, as cognitive of it, and thus are valid for every one. If we judge Objects merely according to concepts, then all representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can be no rule according to which any one is to be forced to recognise anything as beautiful. We cannot press [upon others] by the aid of any reasons or fundamental propositions our judgement that a coat, a house, or a flower is beautiful. We wish to submit the Object to our own eyes, as if the satisfaction in it depended on sensation; and yet if we then call the object beautiful, we believe that we speak with a universal voice, and we claim the assent of every one, although on the contrary all private sensation can only decide for the observer himself and his satisfaction.