We may see now that in the judgement of taste nothing is postulated but such a _universal voice_, in respect of the satisfaction without the intervention of concepts; and thus the _possibility_ of an aesthetical judgement that can, at the same time, be regarded as valid for every one. The judgement of taste itself does not _postulate_ the agreement of every one (for that can only be done by a logically universal judgement because it can adduce reasons); it only _imputes_ this agreement to every one, as a case of the rule in respect of which it expects, not confirmation by concepts, but assent from others. The universal voice is, therefore, only an Idea (we do not yet inquire upon what it rests). It may be uncertain whether or not the man, who believes that he is laying down a judgement of taste, is, as a matter of fact, judging in conformity with that Idea; but that he refers his judgement thereto, and, consequently, that it is intended to be a judgement of taste, he announces by the expression “beauty.” He can be quite certain of this for himself by the mere consciousness of the separation of everything belonging to the Pleasant and the Good from the satisfaction which is left; and this is all for which he promises himself the agreement of every one--a claim which would be justifiable under these conditions, provided only he did not often make mistakes, and thus lay down an erroneous judgement of taste. § 9. _Investigation of the question whether in the judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object_ The solution of this question is the key to the Critique of Taste, and so is worthy of all attention. If the pleasure in the given object precedes, and it is only its universal communicability that is to be acknowledged in the judgement of taste about the representation of the object, there would be a contradiction. For such pleasure would be nothing different from the mere pleasantness in the sensation, and so in accordance with its nature could have only private validity, because it is immediately dependent on the representation through which the object _is given_.