_Emotion_, _i.e._ a sensation in which pleasantness is produced by means of a momentary checking and a consequent more powerful outflow of the vital force, does not belong at all to beauty. But sublimity [with which the feeling of emotion is bound up[29]] requires a different standard of judgement from that which is at the foundation of taste; and thus a pure judgement of taste has for its determining ground neither charm nor emotion, in a word, no sensation as the material of the aesthetical judgement. § 15. _The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection_ _Objective_ purposiveness can only be cognised by means of the reference of the manifold to a definite purpose, and therefore only through a concept. From this alone it is plain that the Beautiful, the judging of which has at its basis a merely formal purposiveness, _i.e._ a purposiveness without purpose, is quite independent of the concept of the Good; because the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, _i.e._ the reference of the object to a definite purpose. Objective purposiveness is either external, _i.e._ the _utility_, or internal, _i.e._ the _perfection_ of the object. That the satisfaction in an object, on account of which we call it beautiful, cannot rest on the representation of its utility, is sufficiently obvious from the two preceding sections; because in that case it would not be an immediate satisfaction in the object, which is the essential condition of a judgement about beauty. But objective internal purposiveness, _i.e._ perfection, comes nearer to the predicate of beauty; and it has been regarded by celebrated philosophers[30] as the same as beauty, with the proviso, _if it is thought in a confused way_. It is of the greatest importance in a Critique of Taste to decide whether beauty can thus actually be resolved into the concept of perfection.