To judge of objective purposiveness we always need not only the concept of a purpose, but (if that purposiveness is not to be external utility but internal) the concept of an internal purpose which shall contain the ground of the internal possibility of the object. Now as a purpose in general is that whose _concept_ can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself; so, in order to represent objective purposiveness in a thing, the concept of _what sort of thing it is to be_ must come first. The agreement of the manifold in it with this concept (which furnishes the rule for combining the manifold) is the _qualitative perfection_ of the thing. Quite different from this is _quantitative_ perfection, the completeness of a thing after its kind, which is a mere concept of magnitude (of totality).[31] In this _what the thing ought to be_ is conceived as already determined, and it is only asked if it has _all_ its requisites. The formal [element] in the representation of a thing, _i.e._ the agreement of the manifold with a unity (it being undetermined what this ought to be), gives to cognition no objective purposiveness whatever. For since abstraction is made of this unity as _purpose_ (what the thing ought to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the representations in the mind of the intuiting subject. And this, although it furnishes a certain purposiveness of the representative state of the subject, and so a facility of apprehending a given form by the Imagination, yet furnishes no perfection of an Object, since the Object is not here conceived by means of the concept of a purpose. For example, if in a forest I come across a plot of sward, round which trees stand in a circle, and do not then represent to myself a purpose, viz. that it is intended to serve for country dances, not the least concept of perfection is furnished by the mere form. But to represent to oneself a formal _objective_ purposiveness without purpose, _i.e._ the mere form of a _perfection_ (without any matter and without the _concept_ of that with which it is accordant, even if it were merely the Idea of conformity to law in general[32]) is a veritable contradiction.