Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsKant, Immanuel
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant, Immanuel
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800; Metaphysics -- Early works to 1800
First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very
concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles
(including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be
derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical
knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore
have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of
physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical
psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure
Understanding and pure Reason.
But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguish able from pure
Mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition;
and for the meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the Pure
Reason (II. "Method of Transcendentalism," Chap. I., Sec. i), where
the distinction between these two employments of the reason is
sufficiently explained. So far concerning the sources of metaphysical
cognition.
§ 2. Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone be called
Metaphysical.
a. Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments in
general.—The peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical
cognition must consist of nothing but a priori judgments. But whatever
be their origin, or their logical form, there is a distinction in
judgments, as to their content, according to which they are either
merely explicative, adding nothing to the content of the cognition, or
expansive, increasing the given cognition: the former may be called
analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments.
Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has
been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though
not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say:
All bodies are extended, I have not amplified in the least my concept
of body, but have only analysed it, as extension was really thought to
belong to that concept before the judgment was made, though it was not
expressed; this judgment is therefore analytical. On the contrary,
this judgment, All bodies have weight, contains in its predicate
something not actually thought in the general concept of the body; it
amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept, and must
therefore be called synthetical.
b. The Common Principle of all Analytical Judgments is the Law of
Contradiction.—All analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of
Contradiction, and are in their nature a priori cognitions, whether
the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For the
predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained
in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without
contradiction. In the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of
the subject in an analytical, but negative, judgment, by the same law
of contradiction. Such is the nature of the judgments: all bodies are
extended, and no bodies are unextended (i.e., simple).
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