Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsKant, Immanuel
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant, Immanuel
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800; Metaphysics -- Early works to 1800
It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which
necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete
solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and
completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental
philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part of
metaphysics, whereas the former science is intended first to
constitute the possibility of the latter, and must therefore precede
all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science,
deprived of all help from other sciences, and consequently in itself
quite new, is required to answer a single question satisfactorily, we
should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in
obscurity.
As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method,
in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually
exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition
(which alone is under consideration here), pure mathematics and pure
natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects
in a definite and actualisable form (in der Anschauung), and
consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition a priori) can
show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in
concreto, that is, its actuality, from which we could proceed to the
reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our
work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to
facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they
must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts.
But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time
well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of
the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must
comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in
spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition a priori which lies at
the bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any
critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called
metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of
such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental
problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions:
1. How is pure mathematics possible?
2. How is pure natural science possible?
3. How is metaphysics in general possible?
4. How is metaphysics as a science possible?
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