Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsKant, Immanuel
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant, Immanuel
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800; Metaphysics -- Early works to 1800
time cannot be refuted, because it relates to a mere being of the
understanding, and without it reason must needs remain forever
dissatisfied?
Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space existing outside
a certain definite place, and in closing it; limits do not require
this, but are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is
not absolutely complete. But our reason, as it were, sees in its
surroundings a space for the cognition of things in themselves, though
we can never have definite notions of them, and are limited to
appearances only.
As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, definite bounds to
it are inconceivable. In mathematics and in natural philosophy human
reason admits of limits, but not of bounds, viz., that something
indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive, but not that it
will at any point find completion in its internal progress. The
enlarging of our views in mathematics, and the possibility of new
discoveries, are infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery
of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by continued
experience and its rational combination. But limits cannot be mistaken
here, for mathematics refers to appearances only, and what cannot be
an object of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts of
metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its sphere, and it
can never lead to them; neither does it require them. It is therefore
not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences,
and there is not, as it were, any point or line of contact. Natural
science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of things,
which though not appearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of
explaining appearance. Nor does that science require this for its
physical explanations. Nay even if such grounds should be offered from
other sources (for instance, the influence of immaterial beings), they
must be rejected and not used in the progress of its explanations. For
these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object
of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into connexion with
our actual perceptions and empirical laws.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account