[71] The same view seems implied A. 117-8, Mah. 208. Kant apparently thinks of this consciousness as also a self-consciousness (cf. § 9), though it seems that he should have considered it rather as a condition of self-consciousness, cf. p. 204, note 2. [72] Sections 6 and 10. [73] Cf. pp. 202-3. We may now turn to the first of the two main points to be considered, viz. the reason given by Kant for holding that self-consciousness must be possible. In the first paragraph (§§ 1-4) Kant appears twice to state a reason, viz. in §§ 1 and 4. What is meant by the first sentence, "It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible or at least for me nothing"? It is difficult to hold that 'my representations' here means objects of which I am aware, and that the thesis to be established is that I must be capable of being conscious of my own identity throughout all awareness or thought of objects. For the next sentence refers to perceptions as representations which can be given previously to all thought, and therefore, presumably, as something of which I am not necessarily aware. Again, the ground adduced for the thesis would be in part a mere restatement of it, and in part nonsense. It would be 'otherwise something would be apprehended with respect to which I could not be aware that I was apprehending it; in other words, I could not apprehend it [since otherwise I could be aware that I was apprehending it]', the last words being incapable of any interpretation. It is much more probable that though Kant is leading up to self-consciousness, the phrase 'I think' here refers not to 'consciousness that I am thinking', but to 'thinking'. He seems to mean 'It must be possible to apprehend all my 'affections' (i. e. sensations or appearances in me), for otherwise I should have an affection of which I could not be aware; in other words, there could be no such affection, or at least it would be of no possible importance to me.'[74] And on this interpretation self-consciousness is not introduced till § 3, and then only surreptitiously. On neither interpretation, however, does Kant give the vestige of a _reason_ for the possibility of self-consciousness. Again, it seems clear that in § 4 'my representations', and 'representations which belong to me' mean objects of which I am aware (i. e. something presented); for he says of my representations, not that I may not be conscious of them--which he should have said if 'my representations' meant my mental affections of which I could become conscious--but that I may not be conscious of them as my representations. Consequently in § 4 he is merely asserting that I must be able to be conscious of my identity throughout my awareness of objects. So far, then, we find merely the _assertion_