[23] This contention is not refuted by the objection that our distinct apprehension of an individual space is always bound up with an indistinct apprehension of the spaces immediately surrounding it. For our indistinct apprehension cannot be supposed to be of the whole of the surrounding space. [24] It is here assumed that a whole or a totality can be infinite. Cf. p. 102. In the _second_ place, the distinctions just drawn afford no ground for distinguishing space as something perceived from any other characteristic of objects as something conceived; for any other characteristic admits of corresponding distinctions. Thus, with respect to colour it is possible to distinguish (_a_) individual colours which we perceive; (_b_) colouredness in general, which we conceive by reflecting on the common character exhibited by individual colours and which involves various kinds or species of colouredness; (_c_) the totality of individual colours, the thought of which is reached by considering the nature of colouredness in general.[25] [25] For a possible objection and the answer thereto, see note, p. 70. Both in the case of colour and in that of space there is to be found the distinction between universal and individual, and therefore also that between conception and perception. It may be objected that after all, as Kant points out, there is only one space, whereas there are many individual colours. But the assertion that there is only one space simply means that all individual bodies in space are related spatially. This will be admitted, if the attempt be made to think of two bodies as in different spaces and therefore as not related spatially. Moreover, there is a parallel in the case of colour, since individual coloured bodies are related by way of colour, e. g. as brighter and duller; and though such a relation is different from a relation of bodies in respect of space, the difference is due to the special nature of the universals conceived, and does not imply a difference between space and colour in respect of perception and conception. In any case, space as a whole is not object of perception, which it must be if Kant is to show that space, as being one, is perceived; for space in this context must mean the totality of individual spaces.