It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves the doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par with the Universal Genius in the infinite spiritual Person. The objection is fallacious, because based upon the assumption that likeness in mode of action involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the finite Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal Genius; the objects perceived by both are the same, they are seen in the same light, and so are in accord; but the _range_ of the finite is one, and the _range_ of the infinite is another; and so diverse also are the circumstances attending the act of seeing. The range of the finite Reason is, _always must be, partial_: the range of the infinite Reason is, _always must be, exhaustive_ (not infinite). In circumstances, the finite Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a germ in which it is inactive, and _must_ be developed by association with nature, and under forms of nature; and can never, by any possibility of growth, attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied, or to a point in development from which it can continue its advance as _pure spirit_. It always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a spiritual body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute possession of all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. Hence, while the infinite and finite reasons see the same object in the same light, and therefore _alike_, the difference in range, and the difference in circumstance, must forever constitute them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight just noticed is the _necessary a priori_ ground upon which a moral government is _possible_. In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the two classes of conditions rests, we have been led to distinguish more clearly between the faculties of the mind, and especially to observe how the Pure Reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised. In this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears that the terms must, possible, and the like, being used to express no idea of restraint, as coming from without upon the infinite Person, or of lack or craving, as subsisting within him, are properly employed in expressing the fact that his _Self, as a priori ground for his activity_, is, though the only, yet a real, positive, and irremovable limit, condition, and law of his action. Of two possible ends he may freely choose either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one; but the constituting laws of the Self he _cannot_, and the moral laws of his Self he _will not_, violate.