Classical literature; Courage -- Early works to 1800; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the
younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He
earnestly requests Socrates to remain;--in this showing, as Nicias says,
how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he
has cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often
submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from
Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to
his words.
Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and
more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is
Virtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue
which is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?' Laches
thinks that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his
post.' But some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in
Homer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea.
(2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of military
courage, but of courage of all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and
pains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance.
But courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful and
injurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. But
then again unintelligent endurance may often be more courageous than
the intelligent, the bad than the good. How is this contradiction to be
solved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to the Dorian mode' of words
and actions; for their words are all confusion, although their actions
are courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an argument about endurance.
Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that he knows what courage is,
if he could only tell.
Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which
he has heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is
intelligence.' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort
of intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of things
terrible.' 'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own
art.' 'No they do not. They may predict results, but cannot tell whether
they are really terrible; only the courageous man can tell that.' Laches
draws the inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a
god.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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