SOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches? LACHES: Quite correct. SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past? NICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion. SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful? NICIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils? NICIAS: True. SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time? NICIAS: That is true. SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time? NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true. SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement? NICIAS: I agree, Socrates. SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men. NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say. SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue? NICIAS: It would seem so. SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?