[2] Wên-hsien &c., ch., 211. [3] See Lie-tzŭ’s Chung-hsü-chen-ching (冲虛眞經) Tien-sui (天瑞) ch. where it forms part of a quotation from Hwang-Ti’s writings. [4] See Julien’s Tao-tê-king, p. xxxiii. [5] Hsü Ta-chʽun’s Preface to his edition of the Tao-tê ching. [6] See Wu-Chʽêng’s (吳澄) Tao-tê ching, ch. 1. [7] Hsü Ta-chün’s edition, Prolegomena 2. This statement, however, cannot be verified. [8] See Hsü Ta-chʽün as above. [9] Pauthier, Chine, p. iii. [10] Wên-hsien &c., ch. 211. [11] Mémoire &c., p. 49. [12] Chine Moderne, p.f 350, and Chine, p. 95 &c. [13] Ch., 211. [14] Tao-tê ching, p. ii [15] See the Shang-yu-lu (尙友錄), Ch. 9, art. 王. [16] Notes on Chinese Literature, p. 179. [17] Tao te, &c. Observations Détachées, p. xxxix. [18] Notes on Chinese Literature, p. 173. I have failed, however, to verify the concluding part of the sentence. [19] Notes, &c., p. 173. [20] Notes, &c., p. 174. [21] Notes, &c., p. 173. [22] Shi-chi, Ch. 8. CHAPTER IV. GENERAL VIEW OF LAO-TZŬ’s TEACHINGS. Before proceeding to examine in detail the doctrines of the _Tao-tê Ching_, I shall briefly indicate their general nature; and by way of preface to my own remarks, I now present to the reader the statements of two critics of different countries, and of rather widely separated dates. One of these, _Chu-hsi_ 朱熹, a Chinese philosopher who lived in the 12th century, says:—“Lao-tzŭ’s scheme of philosophy consists in modesty, self-emptiness, the saving of one’s powers, and the refusal in all circumstances to agitate the bodily humours and spirits. Lao-tzŭ’s learning consists, generally speaking, in being void of desires, quiet, and free from exertion—in being self-empty, retiring, and self-controlling (lit., self-keeping) in actual life. Accordingly, what his words are ever inculcating is to have in outward deportment a gentle tenderness and modesty, and to be at the core void of all selfishness, and unhurtful to all things in the world.”[1] The other critic, a French philosopher still living, says:—“La conception de _Lao-tseu_ est un Rationalisme panthéistique absolu dans lequel le monde sensible est consideré comme la cause de toutes les imperfections et de toutes les misères, et la personalité humaine comme un mode inférieur et passager du grand Être, de la grande _Uité_ qui est l’origine et la fin de tous les Êtres. Elle a, comme nous l’avons déjà dit ailleurs une grande analogie avec le système de l’_Identitè absolue_ de Schelling. Il y a cette difference, cependant, que la conception du premier n’est en quelque sorte qu’à l’état rudimentaire, comme la civilization de son époque, tandis que le système du dernier embrasse tous les progrès que la pensée philosophique a fait pendant plus de deux mille ans d’incessants et souvent d’infructueus labeurs.”[2] I am unable to coincide perfectly with the opinions of the above critics, especially with those of the