_Subjection_ is the being put under the control of another. _Submission_ is the delivery of one’s self to the control of another. The one implies the consent of the will, and the other does not. That subjection is an idea which fulfils the condition of slavery will not be disputed by any. Hence our definition is sufficiently wide to embrace that which is conceded by all. But our definition gives much greater breadth to the principle. It takes in _submission_ as well as _subjection_. It assumes that the willing or the nilling of the subject of this form of control does not necessarily enter into the principle which logically defines it. He who is subjected to such control is a slave; and he who submits to such control is not the less so. This principle might therefore be still further generalized--_control by the will of another_, with its correlative idea submission or subjection only implied. But we prefer to define it in the terms employed, as being more likely to be appreciated in the sense intended. Are we correct in giving this wide compass of meaning to the principle in question? Do we assume too much when we say that a man is not the less a captive, and subject to the control of the captor, because he voluntarily gives himself up as such? Is a man then the less a slave who voluntarily consents to be controlled by the will of another? The popular use of terms in all languages shows that mankind have conceded this point. They all apply the idea of slave to such a case. Nay, more, they furnish a constructive meaning of the term based upon this meaning. They call a man a “slave to his passions,” who has _voluntarily_ given himself up to be controlled in his future volitions by his passions as the subjective motive of his actions. “No bondage is more grievous than that which is voluntary,” says Seneca. “To be a slave to the passions is more grievous than to be a slave to a tyrant,” says Pythagoras. “No one can be free who is intent on the indulgence of evil passions,” says Plato. And Cicero says, “All wicked men are slaves.” St. Paul, Rom. vi. 16, uses the term in the same sense, and with the greatest propriety: “Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants [δούλους, _slaves_] to obey, his servants [slaves] ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or obedience unto righteousness?” (See Dr. A. Clarke, _in loc._) And again, Ephesians vi. 5-7: “Servants, [δοῦλοι.] be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your hearts as unto Christ: not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men.” _Doing the will of God--with good will._ We must certainly understand that it was the duty of those slaves to give both assent and consent to their condition, as a thing coming to them in the order of God’s providence, _and pleasing to him_; and therefore