Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
An hypothesis, then, in the first stage of inquiry, far from being
inconsistent with sound philosophy, may be said to be essential to it.
But it is essential only in this first stage, as suggesting what is
afterwards to be verified or disproved; and, when the experiments or
observations to which it directs us do not verify it, it is no longer
to be entertained, even as an hypothesis. If we observe a phenomenon,
which we never have observed before, it is absolutely impossible for
us, not to think of the analogous cases which we may have seen; since
they are suggested by a principal of association, which is as truly
a part of our constitution, as the senses with which we perceived
the phenomenon itself; and, if any of these analogies strike us as
remarkably coincident, it is equally impossible for us not to imagine,
that the cause, which we knew in that former instance, may also be
present in this analogical instance, and that they _may_, therefore,
both be reduced to the same class. To stop here, and, from this mere
analogy, to infer positive identity of the causes, and to follow out
the possible consequences in innumerable applications, would be to do,
as many great artists in systematizing have done. What a philosopher,
of sounder views, however, would do in such a case, is very different.
He would assume, indeed, as _possible_ or perhaps as _probable_, the
existence of the supposed cause. But he would assume it, only to direct
his examination of its reality, by investigating, as far as he was
able, from past experience, what the circumstances would have been, in
every respect, if the cause supposed had been actually present; and,
even if these were all found to be exactly coincident, though he would
think the presence of the cause more probable, he would be very far
from considering it as certain, and would still endeavour to lessen the
chances of fallacy, by watching the circumstances, should they again
recur, and varying them, by experiment, in every possible way.
This patience and caution, however, essential as they are to just
philosophizing, require, it must be confessed, no slight efforts of
self-denial, but of a self-denial which is as necessary to intellectual
excellence as the various moral species of self-denial are to
excellence and virtue.
“Mr Locke, I think,” says Dr Reid, “mentions an eminent musician,
who believed that God created the world in six days, and rested the
seventh, because there are but seven notes in music. I myself,” he
continues, “knew one of that profession, who thought that there could
be only three parts in harmony, to wit, bass, tenor, and treble;
because there are but three persons in the Trinity.”[30]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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