Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
That hypotheses, in that wide sense of the word which implies every
thing conjectural, are without use in philosophy, it would be absurd
to affirm, since every inquiry may, in that wide sense, be said to
pre-suppose them, and must always pre-suppose them if the inquiry have
any object. They are of use, however, not as superseding investigation,
but as directing investigation to certain objects,--not as telling
us, what we are to believe, but as pointing out to us what we are to
endeavour to ascertain. An hypothesis, in this view of it, is nothing
more than a reason for making one experiment or observation rather
than another; and it is evident, that, without some reason of this
kind, as experiment and observations are almost infinite, inquiry
would be altogether profitless. To make experiments, at random, is not
to _philosophize_; it becomes philosophy, only when the experiments
are made with a certain view; and to make them, with any particular
view, is to suppose the presence of something, the operation of which
they will tend either to prove or disprove. When Torricelli, for
example,--proceeding on the observation previously made, by Galileo,
with respect to the limited height to which water could be made to rise
in a pump,--that memorable observation, which demonstrated, at last,
after so many ages of errors, what ought not for a single moment to
have required to be demonstrated; the absurdity of the horror of a void
ascribed to nature--when, proceeding in this memorable observation,
Torricelli made his equally memorable experiment with respect to the
height of the column of mercury supported in an inverted tube, and
found, on comparison of their specific gravities, the columns of
mercury and water to be exactly equiponderant, it is evident that he
was led to the experiment with the mercury by the supposition, that
the rise of fluids _in vacuo_ was occasioned by some counterpressure,
exactly equal to the weight supported, and that the column of mercury,
therefore should be less in height than the column of water, in
the exact inverse ratio of their specific gravities, by which the
counterpressure was to be sustained. To conceive the air, which was
then universally regarded as essentially light, to be not light but
heavy, so as to press on the fluid beneath, was, at that time, to make
as bold a supposition as could be made. It was indeed, a temporary
hypothesis, even when it led to that experimental demonstration of the
fact, which proved it forever after not to be hypothetical.
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