Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
After thus distinguishing all that is truly _present_ in consciousness,
from common remembrance, I surely need not undertake, at any length, to
distinguish it from that peculiar species of remembrance, which goes
under the name of _conscience_; though their similar etymology may have
a slight tendency to mislead. _Conscience_ is our _moral memory_;--it
is the _memory of the heart_, if I may apply to it a phrase, which, in
its original application, was much more happily employed, by one of the
deaf and dumb pupils of the Abbe Sicard, who, on being asked what he
understood by the word _gratitude_, wrote down immediately, “_Gratitude
is the memory of the heart_.”
The power of conscience does, indeed, what consciousness does not. It
truly doubles all our feelings, when they have been such as virtue
inspired; “Hoc est vivere _bis_, vita posse priore frui;” and it
multiplies them in a much more fearful proportion, when they have
been of an opposite kind--arresting, as it were every moment of
guilt, which, of itself, would have passed away, as fugitive as our
other moments, and suspending them forever before our eyes, in fixed
and terrifying reality. “Prima et maxima peccantium est pæna,” says
Seneca, “_peccasse_; nec ullum scelus, illud fortuna exornet muneribus
suis, licet tueatur ac vindicet, impunitum est quoniam sceleris in
scelere supplicium est.”[43] “The first and the greatest punishment
of guilt, is to have been guilty; nor can any crime, though fortune
should adorn it with all her most lavish bounty, as if protecting and
vindicating it, pass truly unpunished; because the punishment of the
base or atrocious deed, is in the very baseness or atrocity of the deed
itself.” But this species of memory, which we denominate _conscience_,
and, indeed, every species of memory, which must necessarily have for
its object the past, is essentially different from the consciousness
which we have been considering, that, in its very definition, is
limited to _present_ feelings, and of which, if we really had such an
intellectual power, our moral conscience would, in Dr Reid's sense of
the term, be an _object_ rather than a part.
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