Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
Consciousness, then, I conclude, in its simplest acceptation, when
it is understood as regarding the present only, is no distinct power
of the mind, or name of a distinct class of feelings, but is only
a general term for all our feelings, of whatever species these may
be, sensations, thoughts, desires;--in short, all those states or
affections of mind, in which the phenomena of mind consist; and when
it expresses more than this, it is only the remembrance of some
former state of the mind, and a feeling of the relation of the past
and the present as states of one sentient substance. The term is very
conveniently used for the purpose of abbreviation, when we speak of the
whole variety of our feelings, in the same manner as any other general
term is used, to express briefly the multitude of individuals that
agree in possessing some common property of which we speak; when the
enumeration of these, by description and name, would be as wearisome to
the patience, as it would be oppressive to the memory. But still, when
we speak of the evidence of consciousness, we mean nothing more, than
the evidence implied in the mere existence of our sensations, thoughts,
desires,--which is utterly impossible for us to believe to be and not
to be; or, in other words, impossible for us to feel and not to feel at
the same moment. This precise limitation of the term, I trust, you will
keep constantly in mind in the course of our future speculations.
FOOTNOTES:
[41] Pope's Essay on Man, Ep. ii. v. 35-39; 19-24; and 29, 30.
[42] Ad Lectorem.--A Note prefixed to the Elementa Philosophiæ. 4to.
Amstelod. 1668.
[43] Epist. 97.
LECTURE XII.
ON CONSCIOUSNESS, CONTINUED,--ON MENTAL IDENTITY,--IDENTITY
IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE DOCTRINE OF MATERIALISM,--DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
PERSONAL IDENTITY AND MENTAL IDENTITY,--OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF
MENTAL IDENTITY STATED.
In my last Lecture, Gentlemen, I brought to a conclusion my remarks
on the _nature_ and _objects_ of _Physical Inquiry_,--the clear
understanding of which seemed to me, essentially necessary before
we could enter with any prospect of success, on the physiological
investigation of the Mind.
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