The first stage of our generalization, then, has been the reduction of all the mental phenomena to two definite classes, according as the causes, or immediate antecedents, of our feelings are themselves mental or material. Our next stage must be the still further reduction of these, by some new generalizations of the phenomena of each class. The former of these classes,--that of our _external_ affections of the mind,--is, indeed, so very simple, as to require but little subdivision. The other class, however, that of the internal affections or states of the mind,--comprehends so large a proportion of the mental phenomena, and these so various, that, without many subdivisions, it would be itself of little aid to us in our arrangement. The first great subdivision, then, which I would form, of the internal class, is into our _intellectual states of mind_, and our _emotions_. The latter of these classes comprehends all, or nearly all the mental states, which have been classed, by others, under the head of active powers. I prefer, however, the term _emotions_, partly, because I wish to avoid the phrase _active powers_,--which, I own, appears to me awkward and ambiguous, as opposed to other powers, which are not said to be passive; and partly, for reasons before mentioned, because our intellectual states or energies,--far from being opposed to our active powers,--are, as we have seen, essential elements of their activity,--so essential, that, without them, _these_ never could have had the name of _active_; and because I wish to comprehend, under the term, various states of the mind, which cannot, with propriety, in any case, be termed _active_,--such as grief, joy, astonishment,--and others which have been commonly, though, I think, inaccurately, ascribed to the intellectual faculties,--such as the feelings of beauty and sublimity,--feelings, which are certainly much more analogous to our other emotions,--to our feelings of love or awe,--for example,--than to our mere remembrances or reasonings, or to any other states of mind, which can strictly be called intellectual. I speak at present, it must be remembered, of the mere feelings produced by the contemplation of beautiful or sublime objects,--not of the judgment, which we form, of objects, as more or less fit to excite these feelings; the judgment being truly _intellectual_, like all our other judgments; but being, at the same time, as distinct from the _feelings_ which it measures, as any other judgment from the external or internal objects which it compares.