Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
Our emotions, then, even in the cases in which they seem most directly
to _co-exist_ with perception, are still easily distinguishable from
it; and, in like manner, when they arise from the _intellectual states_
of memory, imagination, comparison, they are equally distinguishable
from what we _remember_, or _imagine_, or _compare_. They form truly
a separate order of the internal affections of the mind,--as distinct
from the intellectual phenomena, as the class, to which they both
belong, is distinguishable from the class of external affections, that
arise immediately from the presence of objects without.
FOOTNOTES:
[57] Instead of “not to dethrone,” the original has “and not to mar.”
[58] Night Thoughts, viii. 595-599.
[59] Pleasures of Imagination, Book III. v. 464-478.
LECTURE XVII.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHENOMENA OF MIND.--CLASS I. EXTERNAL
STATES.--INTRODUCTORY.
In my last Lecture, Gentlemen, I endeavoured to prepare the way,
for arranging, in certain classes, that almost infinite variety of
phenomena, which the mind exhibits,--pointing out to you the peculiar
difficulty of such a classification, in the case of phenomena so
indefinite and fugitive, as those of the mind, and the nature of that
generalizing principle of analogy or resemblance, on which every
classification, whether of the material or mental phenomena, must
alike proceed. I then took a slight view of the primary, leading,
divisions of the phenomena of the mind, which have met with most
general adoption,--the very ancient division of them, as of two great
departments, belonging to the _understanding_ and the _will_,--and
the similar division of them, as referable to two classes of powers,
termed the _intellectual_ and _active powers_ of the mind. I explained
to you the reasons, which led me to reject both these divisions, as
at once incomplete, from not comprehending all the phenomena, and
inaccurate, from confounding even those phenomena, which they may truly
be considered as comprehending.
After rejecting these, it became necessary to attempt some new
arrangement, especially as we found reason to believe that some
advantage could scarcely fail to arise from the attempt itself, even
though it should fail as to its great object; and we, therefore,
proceeded to consider and arrange the phenomena, as nearly as possible,
in the same manner as we should have done, if no arrangement of them
had ever been made before.
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