Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
From such a society,--if, indeed, we could hold any communication
with these profound algebraists, except in their common science of
numbers,--we might undoubtedly learn, what are the direct immediate
affections of mind, to which our senses individually give rise, and
consequently, how much, while feeling has blended with feeling,
they have reciprocally operated on each other. But, in our present
circumstances, unaided by intercourse with such living abstractions,
it is impossible for us to remove wholly this uncertainty, as to
the kind and degree of influence, which experience may have had, in
modifying our primary sensations. We may wish, indeed, to be able
to distinguish our _present_ feelings, from those which the same
objects _originally_ excited; but, since no memory can go back to
the period, at which we did not perceive longitudinal distance, as
it were, immediately by the eye, as little, we may suppose, can any
memory go back to the period, when other sensations, less interesting
than those of vision, were first excited. Could we trace the series of
feelings, in a single mind,--as variously modified, in the progress
from infancy to maturity,--we should know more of the intellectual
and moral nature of man, than is probably ever to be revealed to his
inquiry,--when in ages, as remote from that in which we live, and
perhaps as much more enlightened, as our own age may be said to be
in relation to the period of original darkness and barbarism, he is
still to be searching into his own nature, with the same avidity as
now, He must, indeed be a very dull observer, who has not felt, on
looking at an infant, some desire to know the little processes of
thought, that are going on in his curious and active mind; and who, on
reflecting on the value, as an attainment in science, which the sagest
philosopher would set on the consciousness of those acquisitions which
infancy has already made, is not struck with that nearness, in which,
in some points, extreme knowledge and extreme ignorance may almost
be said to meet. What metaphysician is there, however subtile and
profound in his analytical inquiries, and however successful in the
analyses which he has made, who would not give all his past discovery,
and all his hopes of future discovery, for the certainty of knowing
with exactness what every infant feels? The full instruction, which
such a view of our progressive feelings, from their very origin, in
the first sensations of life, would afford, Nature, in her wisdom,
however, has not communicated to us,--more than she has communicated
to us the nature of that state of being, which awaits the soul after
it has finished its career of mortality. Our existence seems, in our
conception of it, never to have had a beginning. As far back as we can
remember any event, there is always a period, that appears to us still
farther back, the events of which we cannot distinguish; as, when we
look toward the distant horizon, we see, less and less distinctly, in
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