Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
the case of longitudinal distance in vision, we perceive _colour_ at
one distance rather than at another. Yet there is as little reason,
from the nature of the organic changes themselves, to suppose, that
different affections of our auditory nerves should _originally_ give us
different notions of distance, as that such notions should originally
be produced by different affections of the retina: and, as in sight
and hearing, so it is far from improbable, that, in all our senses,
there may, by the reciprocal influence of these upon each other, or by
the repeated lessons of individual experience in each, be a similar
modification of the original simple feelings, which, in that first
stage of existence that opened to us the world and its phenomena,
each individual organ separately afforded. Our reasoning with respect
to them, therefore, as original organs of sense, may, perhaps, be as
false, as our chemical reasoning would be, were we to attempt to infer
the properties of an uncombined acid, or alkali, from our observation
of the very different properties of a neutral salt, into the
composition of which we know that the acid or the alkali has entered.
If, indeed, it were in our power to be introduced to a society, like
that of which Diderot speaks, in his Letter on the Deaf and Dumb, and
to hold communication with them, all our doubts on this subject would
be removed. “What a strange society,” says he, “would five persons
make, each of them endowed with one only of our five different senses;
and no two of the party with the same sense! There can be no doubt,
that, differing, as they must differ, in all their views of nature,
they would treat each other as madmen, and that each would look upon
the others with all due contempt. It is, indeed, only an image of what
is happening every moment in the world; we have but one sense, and we
judge of every thing.”[63]--“There is, however,” he justly remarks,
“_one_ science, though but one science, in which the whole society of
the different senses might agree,--the science which has relation to
the _properties of number_. They might each arrive, by their separate
abstractions, at the sublimest speculations of arithmetic and algebra;
they might fathom the depths of analysis, and propose and resolve
problems of the most complicated equations, as if they were all so many
Diophantuses. It is perhaps,” he adds, “what the oyster is doing in its
shell.”[64]
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