Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
Nothing can appear to our eyes more uniform than a piece of glass;
yet we know, from its composition, as a product of art, that it is
a congeries of bodies, which have no similarity to each other, and
which truly exist separately from each other, in the compound, as
they existed separately before the composition, though the lines of
space which divide them have now ceased to be visible to our weak
organs; and though, instead of being composed of alkaline and siliceous
matter, which we know to be different in their qualities, the beautiful
transparent substance, considered by us, were, as far as we know,
_simple_, in the chemical sense of the term, it would still be as
truly an aggregate of many bodies, not dissimilar, indeed, as in the
former case, but each similar in qualities to the aggregate itself.
The aggregate, in short, is, in every case, but a name invented by
ourselves; and what we term the constituent elements, are all that
truly exists. To inquire into the composition of a body, is, therefore,
only to inquire what these separate bodies are which we have chosen to
consider as _one_, or rather which are ranked by us as one, from their
apparent continuity.
I have dwelt the longer on this point of the _unity_ of an aggregate
mass, as derived from the mind of the observer only, and not from its
constituent bodies, which are truly separate and independent of each
other, and must always be separate and independent, whatever changes
they may seem to undergo, in the various processes of composition
and decomposition, because this is one of the most simple, and, at
the same time, one of the most convincing examples of a tendency of
the mind, which we shall often have occasion to remark in the course
of our intellectual analysis,--the tendency to ascribe to substances
without, as if existing in them like permanent physical qualities,
the relations which ourselves have formed, by the mere comparison of
objects with objects, and which, in themselves, as relations, are
nothing more than modifications of our own mind. It is very difficult
for us to believe, that, when we speak of a rock, or a mountain, or,
perhaps, still more, when we speak of a single leaf or blade of grass
as _one_, we speak of a plurality of independent substances, which
may exist apart, as they now exist together, and which have no other
unity than in our conception. It is the same with every other species
of relation. The tallness of a tree, the lowness of a shrub or weed,
as these relative terms are used by _us_ in opposition, do not express
any real quality of the tree, or shrub, or weed, but only the fact
that our mind has considered them together; all which they express, is
the mere comparison that is in _us_, not any quality in the external
objects; and yet we can scarcely bring ourselves to think, but that
independently of this comparison, there is some quality, in the tree,
which corresponds with our notion of tallness, and some opposite
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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