Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
quality in the shrub or weed, which corresponds with our notion of
shortness or lowness; so that the tree would deserve the name of tall,
though it were the only object in existence, and the shrub or weed, in
like manner, the epithet of lowly, though it alone existed, without
a single object with which it could be compared. These instances, as
I have said, are simple, but they will not be the less useful, in
preparing your minds for considering the more important natures of
relation in general, that imply, indeed, always some actual qualities
in the objects themselves, the perception of which leads us afterwards
to consider them as related, but no actual quality in either of the
objects that primarily and directly corresponds with the notion of the
relation itself, as there are qualities of objects that correspond
directly with our sensations of warmth or colour, or any other of the
sensations excited immediately by external things. The relation is, in
every sense of the word _mental_, not merely as being a feeling of
the mind, for our knowledge of the qualities of external things is,
in this sense, equally mental; but, as having its cause and origin
directly in the very nature of the _mind itself_, which cannot regard a
number of objects, without forming some comparison, and investing them
consequently with a number of relations. I have already spoken of the
intellectual medium, through which external objects become known to us;
and the metaphor is a just one. The medium, in this case, as truly as
in the transmission of light, communicates something of its own to that
which it conveys; and it is as impossible for us to perceive objects
long or often together, without that comparison which instantly invests
them with certain relations, as it would be for us to perceive objects,
for a single moment, free from the tint of the coloured glass through
which we view them. “Omnes perceptiones,” says Lord Bacon, using a
similar figure, “omnes perceptiones, tam sensus quam mentis, sunt ex
analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi; estque intellectus humanus
instar speculi inæqualis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturæ rerum
immiscet, eamque distorquet et inficit.”
But, whatever may be thought of relations in general, there can be no
question, at least, as to the nature of that unity which we ascribe to
bodies. We have seen, that the substance, which, in thought we regard
as _one_, is, in truth, not _one_, but _many_ substances, to which
our thought alone gives unity; and that all inquiry, therefore, with
respect to the nature of a substance, as it exists in space, is an
inquiry into the nature of those separate bodies, that occupy the space
which we assign to the imaginary aggregate.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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