223. Property, whether regarded as the appropriation of nature by men of different powers, or as the means required for the fulfilment of different social functions, _must_ be unequal 224. Freedom of trade, another source of inequality, follows necessarily from the same view of property: freedom of bequest is more open to doubt 225. It seems to follow from the general right of a man to provide for his future, and (with certain exceptions) to be likely to secure the best distribution; but it does _not_ imply the right of entail 226. Returning to the question raised in sec. 220, observe _(a)_ that accumulation by one man does not itself naturally imply deprivation of other men, but rather the contrary 227. Nor is the prevalence of great capitals and hired labour in itself the cause of the bad condition of so many of the working classes 228. The cause is to be found, not in the right of property and accumulation, but (partly at least) in the fact that the land has been originally appropriated by conquest 229. Hence _(a)_ the present proletariate inherit the traditions of serfdom, and _(b)_ under landowning governments land has been appropriated unjustifiably, i.e. in various ways prejudicial to the common interest 230. And further the masses crowded through these causes into large towns have till lately had little done to improve their condition 231. Whether, if the state did its duty, it would still be advisable to limit bequest of land, is a question which must be differently answered according to circumstances 232. The objection to the appropriation by the state of 'unearned increment' is that it is so hard to distinguish between 'earned' and 'unearned'. O._ The right of the state in regard to the family._ 233. The rights of husband over wife and father over children are _(a)_ like that of property in being rights against all the world, _(b)_ unlike it in being rights over _persons_, and therefore reciprocal 234. The latter characteristic would be expressed by German writers by saying that both the 'subject' and the 'object' of these rights are persons 235. Three questions about them: (1) What makes man capable of family life? (2) How does it come to have rights? (3) What ought the form of those rights to be? 236. (1) The family implies the same effort after permanent self-satisfaction as property, together with a permanent interest in a particular woman and her children 237. The capacity for this interest is essential to anything which can be rightly called family life, whatever lower forms of life may historically have preceded it 238. (2) The rights of family life arise from the mutual recognition of this interest by members of the same clan (in which the historical family always appears as an element) 239. Its development has been in the direction _(a)_ of giving _all_ men and women the right to marry, _(b)_ of recognising the claims of husband and wife to be _reciprocal_. Both these imply monogamy