Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet — John Shaqi
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
[1] In that sense in which 'freedom' expresses a state of the soul,
as distinct from a civil relation.
2. As to the sense given to 'freedom,' it must of course be admitted
that every usage of the term to express anything but a social and
political relation of one man to others involves a metaphor. Even in
the original application its sense is by no means fixed. It always
implies indeed some exemption from compulsion by others, but the
extent and conditions of this exemption, as enjoyed by the 'freeman'
in different states of society, are very various. As soon as the term
'freedom' comes to be applied to anything else than an established
relation between a man and other men, its sense fluctuates much more.
Reflecting on their consciousness, on their 'inner life' (i.e. their
life as viewed from within), men apply to it the terms with which
they are familiar as expressing their relations to each other. In
virtue of that power of self-distinction and self-objectification,
which he expresses whenever he says 'I,' a man can set over against
himself his whole nature or any of its elements, and apply to the
relation thus established in thought a term borrowed from relations
of outward life. Hence, as in Plato, the terms 'freedom' and
'bondage' may be used to express a relation between the man on the
one side, as distinguishing himself from all impulses that do not
tend to his true good, and those impulses on the other. He is a
'slave' when they are masters of him, 'free' when master of them.
The metaphor in this form was made further use of by the Stoics, and
carried on into the doctrines of the Christian Church. Since there is
no kind of impulse or interest which a man cannot so distinguish from
himself as to present it as an alien power, of which the influence on
him is bondage, the particular application of the metaphor is quite
arbitrary. It may come to be thought that the only freedom is to be
found in a life of absolute detachment from all interests; a life
in which the pure ego converses solely with itself or with a God,
who is the same abstraction under another name. This is a view into
which both saints and philosophers have been apt to fall. It means
practically, so far as it means anything, absorption in some one
interest with which the man identifies himself in exclusion of all
other interests, which he sets over against himself as an influence
to be kept aloof.
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