[1] For the definition of 'fortitudo,' see _Ethics_, III. 59, Schol. 'Omnes actiones quae sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem referuntur, quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero, quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem, qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem ... cupiditatem qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare et sibi amicitia jungere.' 36. This conclusion of Spinoza's doctrine of the state does not seem really consistent with the beginning. At the outset, no motives are recognised in men but such as render them 'natura hostes.' From the operation of these motives the state is supposed to result. Each individual finds that the war of all against all is weakness for all. Consequently the desire on the part of each to strengthen himself, which is a form of the universal effort 'suum esse conservare,' leads to combination, it being discovered that 'homini nihil homine utilius' (_Eth_. IV. 18. Schol.). But we are expressly told that the civil state does not bring with it other motives than those operative 'in statu naturali.' 'Homo namque tam in statu naturali quam civili ex legibus suae naturae agit, suaeque utilitati consulit.' But then it appears that there supervenes or may supervene on such motives 'constans voluntas id exsequendi quod ex communi civitatis decreto fieri debet,' and that not of a kind which seeks to carry out the 'commune decretum' as a means of escaping pain or obtaining pleasure, for it is said to arise from the 'animi fortitudo' which rests on reason ('ad mentem refertur quatenus intelligit') and includes 'generositas' defined as above. It is also said that the true object of 'imperium' is 'vitam concorditer transigere' or 'vitam colere' in a sense of 'vita' in which it 'maxime ratione ... definitur.' And as the 'imperium' established for this end is one which 'multitudo libera instituit,' it seems [1] to be implied that there is a desire for such an end on the part of the people. It is not explained how such desires should arise out of the conflict of 'naturales potentiae' or out of the impulses which render men 'natura hostes.' On the other hand, if the elements of them already exist in the impulses which lead to the formation of the 'status civilis,' the reasons for saying that men are 'natura hostes' disappear, and we get a different view of 'jus,' whether 'naturale' or 'civile,' from that which identifies it simply with 'potentia.' Some power of conceiving and being interested in a good _as common_, some identification of the 'esse' of others with the 'suum esse' which every man, as Spinoza says, seeks to preserve and promote, must be supposed in those who form the most primitive social combinations, if these are to issue in a state directed to such ends and maintained by such a 'constans voluntas' as Spinoza describes. And it is the interest of men in a