Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
Knowledge, in fine, may be regarded as an ascending series of four
terms. The first is constituted by sensations associated together
in such a way that a relation of antecedence and consequence exists
between them. This is "experience." The second stage comes into
existence when we connect these experiences, not by mere relations of
"consecution," but by their conditions, by the principle of causality,
and especially by that of sufficient reason, which connects them with
the supreme intelligence, God. This stage is science. The third is
knowledge of the axioms and necessary truths in and of themselves,
not merely as involved in science. The fourth is self-consciousness,
the knowledge of intelligence, in its intimate and universal nature,
by which we know God, the mind, and all real substance. In the order of
time the stage of experience is first, and that of self-consciousness
last. But in the lowest stage there are involved the others. The
progress of knowledge consists in the development or unfolding of
this implicit content, till intelligence, spirit, activity, is clearly
revealed as the source and condition of all.
CHAPTER XI.
THE THEOLOGY OF LEIBNIZ.
One of the chapters concerning knowledge is entitled, "The Knowledge
that we have of God." This introduces us to the theology of Leibniz
and indirectly to the completion of those ethical doctrines already
outlined in the chapter on will. Leibniz employs three arguments to
prove the existence of God: that of God as the sufficient reason of the
world (substantially the cosmological proof); of God as the source of
the pre-established harmony (an extension of the teleological proof);
and the ontological. The latter he accepts as it came from the hands
of Descartes, but insists that it requires an added argument before it
ranks as anything more than presumptive proof. The Anselmic-Cartesian
argument, as stated by Leibniz, is as follows: "God is defined as
the greatest, or most perfect, of beings, or as a being of supreme
grandeur and perfection. But in the notion of a perfect being,
existence must be included, since it is something more to exist than
not to exist. Or existence is a perfection, and hence must belong to
the most perfect being; otherwise some perfection would be lacking,
which is contrary to the definition." Or as Descartes sometimes puts
it, in the notion of anything like a tree, a mountain, a triangle,
contingency is contained. We may conceive such an object to exist or
not, as we like. There is no necessity involved in our thought. But we
cannot think of a perfect being except as existing. It does not rest
with the decision of our thinking whether or not to include existence
in this notion. We must necessarily think existence as soon as we think
such a being.
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