Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
Leibniz takes a middle position, he says, between those who
consider this a demonstrative argument, and those who regard it
as a mere paralogism. It is pre-supposed by this argument that the
notion of a Supreme Being is possible, or that it does not involve
contradiction. This pre-supposition is to be proved. First, it is
well to simplify the argument itself. The Cartesian definition may
be reduced to this: "God is a being in whom existence and essence are
one. From this definition it follows as a corollary that such a being,
if possible, exists. For the essence of a thing being just that which
constitutes its possibility, it is evident that to exist by its essence
is the same as to exist by its possibility. Being in itself, then,
or God, may be most simply defined as the Being who must exist if he
is possible."
There are two ways of proving this last clause (namely, that he
is possible) the direct and the indirect. The indirect is employed
against those who assert that from mere notions, ideas, definitions or
possible essences, it is not possible to infer actual existence. Such
persons simply deny the possibility of being in itself. But if
being-in-itself, or absolute being, is impossible, being-by-another,
or relative, is also impossible; for there is no "other" upon which
it may depend. Nothing, in this case, could exist. Or if necessary
being is not possible, there is no being possible. Put in another way,
God is as necessary for possibility as for actual existence. If there
is possibility of anything, there is God. This leads up to the direct
proof; for it follows that, if there be a possibility of God,--the
Being in whom existence and essence are one,--he exists. "God alone
has such a position that existence is necessary, if possible. But
since there can be nothing opposed to the possibility of a being
without limit,--a being therefore without negations and without
contradiction,--this is sufficient to prove _a priori_ the existence
of God." In short, God being pure affirmation, pure self-identity,
the idea of his Being cannot include contradiction, and hence is
possible,--and since possible, necessary. Of this conception of God as
the purely self-identical, without negation, we shall have something to
say in the next chapter.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account