Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
Not many men have been so conscious of just the bearings of their
own ideas and of their source as was he. He often allows us a direct
glimpse into the method of his thinking, and nowhere more than when
he says: "Those who give themselves up to the details of science
usually despise abstract and general researches. Those who go into
universal principles rarely care for particular facts. But I equally
esteem both." Leibniz, in other words, was equally interested in the
application of scientific principles to the explanation of the details
of natural phenomena, and in the bearing and meaning of the principles
themselves,--a rare combination, indeed, but one, which existing,
stamps the genuine philosopher. Leibniz substantially repeats this
idea when he says: "Particular effects must be explained mechanically;
but the general principles of physics and mathematics depend upon
metaphysics." And again: "All occurs mechanically; but the mechanical
principle is not to be explained from material and mathematical
considerations, but it flows from a higher and a metaphysical source."
As a man of science, Leibniz might have stopped short with the
ideas of mechanical law, of the application of mathematics, and of
the continuity of development. As a philosopher he could not. There
are some scientific men to whom it always seems a perversion of their
principles to attempt to carry them any beyond their application to the
details of the subject. They look on in a bewildered and protesting
attitude when there is suggested the necessity of any further
inquiry. Or perhaps they dogmatically deny the possibility of any such
investigation, and as dogmatically assume the sufficiency of their
principles for the decision of all possible problems. But bewildered
fear and dogmatic assertion are equally impotent to fix arbitrary
limits to human thought. Wherever there is a subject that has meaning,
there is a field which appeals to mind, and the mind will not cease
its endeavors till it has made out what that meaning is, and has made
it out in its entirety. So the three principles already spoken of were
but the starting-points, the stepping-stones of Leibniz's philosophic
thought. While to physical science they are solutions, to philosophy
they are problems; and as such Leibniz recognized them. What solution
did he give?
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