SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so? HIPPIAS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? HIPPIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and art--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? HIPPIAS: That seems to be true. SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? HIPPIAS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? HIPPIAS: Which he certainly has. SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man? HIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you. SOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the matter begins to be serious both to us and to you.