Lessons of the War: Being Comments from Week to Week to the Relief of LadysmithWilkinson, Spenser
History
Lessons of the War: Being Comments from Week to Week to the Relief of Ladysmith
Wilkinson, Spenser
South African War, 1899-1902
decisive point, and a first-rate general never lets a single man go away
from his main force except for a necessary object important enough to be
worth the risk of a great failure. The capture of Mafeking, of
Kimberley, and even of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, would not compensate the Boers
for failure in Natal. Neither Colonel Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewich
would be likely to make a serious inroad into Boer territory. I should
therefore have expected the Boers merely to watch these places with
parties hardly larger than patrols and to have thrown all their energy
into a determined attack on Sir George White. But they seem to have sent
considerable bodies, in each case several thousand men, against both
Mafeking and Kimberley. This proves either that they have a
superabundance of force at their disposal or that they have failed to
grip the situation and to concentrate their minds, their will, and their
troops upon the key of the whole position. I believe the latter to be
the true interpretation.
If the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisive
blow, its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as you
can, for in war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easy
to judge whether the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission.
When the ultimatum expired his forces were spread along the border line
of the Free State and the Transvaal, so that a forward movement would
concentrate them in the northern triangle of Natal. The advance has not
been resisted, and at the end of a week the Transvaal wing of the
combined army has reached a point a few miles north of Glencoe, while
the bulk of the Free State wing is still behind the passes. The movement
has not been rapid, but as the ground is difficult--marches through a
mountainous country and in bad weather always take incomparably longer
than is expected--the delay may be due not to lack of energy but to the
inevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time throws no light
on the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels rapidity in the
decisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying with the
Army, the country, and the weather.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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