It has been customary to extol the French signals, as superior to our own; but any man capable of judging, who will compare the two codes, must be convinced, that those now in use in the English fleet are more simple in their principle, more exact in their arrangement, and more easy in their comprehension. The French were long our masters in this art, which lately our naval officers have certainly carried beyond them. Their superior dexterity in making and answering them must not be confounded with the signals themselves. In this respect, from being earlier and more closely trained, I fear it will be found (though with many exceptions on our side) that they surpass us. There is on board every French ship a class of youths, called _pilotins_, who attend solely to this part of naval duty. They are placed under the direction of an experienced quarter-master, and hold a rank immediately below that of midshipman, into which body they are promoted from time to time, according to their merit. Of their deficiency of naval stores every day furnishes me with fresh proofs. The ships by which we were taken had, after a cruize of a few weeks, scarcely a coil of rope to repair their running rigging, or a stick to supply any loss which a sudden gust of wind might have occasioned. But how desperate must the state of France have been, had the American convoy been intercepted by Admiral Montagu! You know already in part my sentiments on that extraordinary failure. Let me now give you fresh cause for amazement; but remember, that I quote the words of another person without asperity, and without pretending to assign to what quarter the culpability of that shameful miscarriage on our side attaches:----Admiral Villaret said a few days since, to a British officer, who was in Admiral Montagu’s squadron: “_Were you not astonished to see me chase you, on the 9th of June last, with my crippled fleet?_”----“_Yes_,” was the answer.----“_My only reason for it was, if possible, to drive you off our coast, as I momently expected the appearance of the great American convoy, the capture of which would have ruined France at that juncture. Why you did not return to the charge, after running us out of sight, you best know. Had you kept on your station two days longer, you must have succeeded, as, on the 11th of June, the whole of this convoy, beyond our expectation, entered Brest, laden with provisions, naval stores, and West Indian productions._” If my cheek reddens on recording this declaration of an enemy, it is with indignation only.