From this angle, liberty may appropriately be resolved into a system of liberties. There are realms of conduct within which, to be free, I must be permitted to act as I please; to be denied self-expression there, is to be denied freedom. What we need to know is, I suggest, first what those realms of conduct are, and, second, what my duty as a citizen is when I am, in any one of them, prohibited from acting as I please. The difficulty here, of course, it is impossible to exaggerate. It is the problem of knowing when a man ought deliberately to make up his mind to break the law or to refuse obedience to it. In the idealist theory, this problem does not arise; it is answered _a priori_ by the definition of freedom as obedience to the law. But because we have rejected this view, we have to admit that there will be occasional disobedience, at the least, and that this may be justified. We have to discover the principles of its justification. Liberty may be resolved into a system of liberties; and from this angle it may be said that it is the purpose of social organization to see to it that this system is adequately safeguarded. How can the state, which charges itself with the function of supreme co-ordination, properly fulfil this task? How can it guarantee to me such an environment to my activity that I do not suffer frustration in my search for happiness? There have been many answers to this question, some of them of the highest interest and importance. One or two I wish to consider partly because of their significance in themselves, and partly because, from that consideration, I wish to make the inference that no merely mechanical arrangements will ever secure freedom in permanence to the citizens of a state. While there are certain constitutional forms which are, as I think, essential to freedom, their mere presence as forms will not, of themselves, suffice to make men free. I shall seek, further, to draw the conclusion that, whatever the forms of social organization, liberty is essentially an expression of an impalpable atmosphere among men. It is a sense that in the things we deem significant there is the opportunity of continuous initiative, the knowledge that we can, so to speak, experiment with ourselves, think differently or act differently, from our neighbours without danger to our happiness being involved therein. We are not free, that is, unless we can form our plan of conduct to suit our own character without social penalties. Freedom is in an important degree a matter of law; but in a degree not less important it is a matter, also, of the _mores_ of the society outside the sphere within which law can operate.