That is a general principle which, stated as baldly as this, does not adequately illustrate the substance it implies. The history of the struggle for popular freedom has given us knowledge of certain rules in the organization of a state the presence of which is fundamental to freedom. It can, I think, be shown that no citizen is secure in liberty unless certain rights are guaranteed to him, rights which the government of the state cannot hope to overthrow; and unless, to secure the maintenance of those rights, there is a separation of the judicial from the executive power. The citizens of a state choose men to make the laws under which they are to live. It is urgent that they should be binding upon all without fear or favour; that I, for instance, should be able to live secure in the knowledge that they will not apply to me differently from their incidence upon others. Clearly enough, in the modern state, the application of law to life demands a vast body of civil servants to administer it. Not the least important problem of our time is that which arises when the legality of their administration is in question. In Anglo-Saxon communities it has been regarded as elementary that the interpretation of law should be entrusted to an independent body of officials--the judges--who can arbitrate impartially between government and citizens. That view I take to be of the first importance to freedom; and its acceptance involves considerations which we must examine in some detail. The business of a judiciary, broadly speaking, is the impartial interpretation of the law as between government and citizen, or between classes of citizens who dispute with one another. The government, for instance, charges a man with treason; obviously he is deprived of something essential to his freedom if the law is strained so as to make of treason something it in fact is not in order to cover the acts which the government seeks to have accepted as treason. Here, obviously, the judge must be assured that his independence may be maintained with safety to himself. He must not suffer in his person or position because of the view he takes. It must not be within the power either of the government or other persons to deprive him of his authority because, as best he may, he applies the law. This, as I think, makes it essential that all judicial appointments should be held during good behaviour. There may be an age-limit of service, of course; but, this apart, nothing should permit the removal of a judge from the bench except corruption or physical unfitness. I do not, therefore, believe that a judicial system founded upon popular election is a satisfactory way of choosing judges, the more so if submission to re-election is involved; and the system, abandoned in England in 1701, of making judicial appointment dependent upon the pleasure of government is equally indefensible. Once a man has been appointed to judicial office nothing