Liberty in the modern stateLaski, Harold J. (Harold Joseph)
Science
Liberty in the modern state
Laski, Harold J. (Harold Joseph)
Liberty; Political science
It is often argued that a theory of liberty which starts from the
effort of the individual to attain happiness must break down because
it fails to remember that society also has rights, and that these are
necessarily superior to those of its component parts. Any organization,
it is said, is more than the units of which it is composed. A
nation-state like America or England is not merely a body of Englishmen
or Americans, but something beyond them. It has a life and a reality,
needs and purposes, which are not exhausted by the sum of the needs
and purposes of its individual members. The liberty of each citizen
is born of, and must be subordinated to, the liberty of that greater
whole from which his whole meaning is derived. For the rights of each
of us depend upon the protective rampart of social organization. It is
because the State enforces our rights as obligations upon others that
we have the opportunity to enjoy them. We are free, it is said, not
for ourselves but for the society which gives us meaning. Where our
interests conflict with the obviously greater interest of the society,
we ourselves must give way.
It is, I think, true to say that an individual abstracted from society
and regarded as entitled to freedom outside its environment is devoid
of meaning. None of us is Crusoe or St. Simeon Stylites on his pillar.
We are born to live our lives in London or New York, Paris or Berlin
or Rome. Our liberty has to be realized in a welter of competing and
co-operating interests which only achieve rational co-ordination by
something not unlike a miracle. The need to give way to others, to
accept, that is, restraint upon our right to unfettered activity
is inherent in the nature of things. But the surrender we make is a
surrender not for the sake of the society regarded as something other
than its members, but exactly and precisely for men and women whose
totality is conveniently summarized in a collective and abstract
noun. I do not understand how England, for instance, can have an
end or purpose different from, or opposed to, the end or purpose of
its citizens. We strive to do our duty to England for the sake of
Englishmen; a duty to England separate from them, and in which they did
not share, is surely inconceivable.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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