But not even yet had he said enough to prove his loyalty to the King. He agrees that war is inevitable, and that the question now is how it may be most effectually carried on, but when he foresees that the King will go in person, he is greatly distressed. He talks loudly about the danger of the King being killed, hints that Henry possessed a courage and a self-sacrifice to the interests of England which would render him impervious to any argument about personal risk, and then launches himself into the heart of his discourse. The King is an absolute necessity to the welfare and progress of the State. If the King were removed, the country would probably be brought face to face with the horrors of a civil war. Cromwell thus brings his hearers to the first great principle of the policy that he was destined later to pursue, namely, concentration of power in the hands of the Crown, as a _sine qua non_ of unity at home and safety abroad. This principle he enforces with many other arguments. The danger from the hostility of Scotland was enormous; let the King ‘Reffrayne his high magnanyme Courage’ and remaining at home, so direct the movements of his forces, that England and Scotland may together move as a unit. France has bought off many who may seem to be England’s allies on the Continent. The consequence of an invasion of France would be the scattering of the army; it might be cut off in an attempt to capture Paris, and England would be left to the mercy of its first invader. The country must make sure of its own safety, before entering upon a war of aggression. He brings up other points to prove his case, and here speaks against the proposed subsidy. He saw, as a merchant, that the amount proposed was excessive; his fear was that all the coin and bullion in the realm would be exhausted by three summers of fruitless warring, so that the nation would be forced ‘to koyne lether agayne,’ as it had done once before. His appreciation of the importance of sound finance, and the evils of a depreciated currency show a knowledge of economic principles far in advance of his time. ‘Yf yt showld fortune o_ur_ most Redowtyd Souerayne, yf he wold nyedys go ou_er_ yn hys owne p_er_sone to happyn by any adu_er_se fortune, whiche almyghty god defend to cum into the hand_es_ of o_ur_ enemyes,’ says Cromwell, ‘how shuld we then be hable to Redeme hym agayne yf they wyll nought for their wynes but golde they wold thynck grete skorne, to take lether for o_ur_ prynce.’ Cromwell had early learned the lesson that money and brains were rapidly becoming far more important factors in winning battles, than mere superiority in brute strength or numbers. In his ingenious argument against the subsidy, he had pleaded the cause of the poor people, on whom the taxes fell most heavily, and had at the same time avoided arousing the opposition of the other party, by his adroit flattery at the outset.