In a council of war, held on the 7th of September, the question was discussed, whether the city should be defended or evacuated. All admitted that it would not be tenable, should it be cannonaded and bombarded. Several of the council, among whom was General Putnam, were for a total and immediate removal from the city; urging that one part of the army might be cut off before the other could support it; the extremities being at least sixteen miles apart, and the whole, when collected, being inferior to the enemy. By removing, they would deprive the enemy of the advantage of their ships; they would keep them at bay; put nothing at hazard; keep the army together to be recruited another year, and preserve the unspent stores and the heavy artillery. Washington himself inclined to this opinion. Others, however, were unwilling to abandon a place which had been fortified with great cost and labor, and seemed defensible, and which, by some, had been considered the key to the northern country; it might dispirit the troops, and enfeeble the cause. General Mercer, who was prevented by illness from attending the council, communicated his opinion by letter. “We should keep New York if possible,” said he, “as the acquiring of it will give eclat to the arms of Great Britain, afford the soldiers good quarters, and furnish a safe harbor for the fleet.” General Greene, also, being still unwell, conveyed his opinion in a letter to Washington, dated Sept. 5th. He advised that the army should abandon both city and island, and post itself at King’s Bridge and along the Westchester shore. That there was no object to be obtained by holding any position below King’s Bridge. The enemy might throw troops on Manhattan Island, from their camps on Long Island, and their ships on the Hudson, and form an intrenched line across it, between the city and the middle division of the army, and support the two flanks of the line by their shipping. In such case, it would be necessary to fight them on disadvantageous terms or submit. The city and island, he observed, were objects not to be put in competition with the general interests of America. Two thirds of the city and suburbs belonged to tories, there was no great reason, therefore, to run any considerable risk in its defence. The honor and interest of America required a general and speedy retreat. But as the enemy, once in possession, could never be dislodged without a superior naval force; as the place would furnish them with excellent winter quarters and barrack room, and an abundant market, he advised to burn both city and suburbs before retreating.[110] Well might the poor, harassed citizens feel hysterical, threatened as they were by sea and land, and their very defenders debating the policy of burning their houses over their heads. Fortunately for them, Congress had expressly forbidden that any harm should be done to New York, trusting, that though the enemy might occupy it for a time, it would ultimately be regained.