After mature reflection, I had determined to reject the mission, if I found this could be done without danger of an open breach with the administration; but if this could not be done, I was resolved to accept it, however disagreeable. The advice of Governor Porter, then at McKibbins’, gave me confidence in the correctness of my own judgment. My position was awkward and embarrassing. There was danger that it might be said (indeed it had already been insinuated in several public journals), that I had selfishly thrown up the mission, because the fishery question had not been entrusted to me, although I knew that actual collision between the two countries on the fishery grounds might be the consequence of the transfer of the negotiation to London. Such a statement could only be rebutted by the publication of the correspondence between the President and myself; but as this was altogether private, such a publication could only be justified in a case of extreme necessity. Besides, I had no reason to believe that the President had taken from me the reciprocity and fishery questions with any deliberate purpose of doing me injury. On the contrary, I have but little doubt that this proceeded from his apprehension that the suspension of the negotiation might produce dangerous consequences on the fishing grounds. I might add that his instructions to me on the Central American questions were as full and ample as I could desire. Many friends believed, _not without reason_, that if I should decline the mission, Mr. Dallas would be appointed; and this idea was very distasteful to them, though not to myself. The following is the substance of the conversation between the President and myself on Wednesday morning, the 13th of July, partly at McKibbins’, and the remainder on board the steamer which took us across to Camden. It was interrupted by the proceedings at Independence Hall on Wednesday morning.