Captain Maitland proceeded to exercise all the vigilance which an occasion so interesting demanded; and it was soon evident, that the presence of the Bellerophon was an absolute bar to Napoleon's escape by means of the frigates, unless it should be attempted by open force. In this latter case, the British officer had formed his plan of bearing down upon and disabling the one vessel, and throwing on board of her a hundred men selected for the purpose, while the Bellerophon set sail with all speed in pursuit of her consort, and thus made sure of both. He had also two small vessels, the Slaney and the Phœbe, which he could attach to the pursuit of the frigate, so as at least to keep her in view. This plan might have failed by accident, but it was so judiciously laid as to have every chance of being successful; and it seems that Napoleon received no encouragement from the commanders of the frigates to try the event of a forcible escape. The scheme of a secret flight was next meditated. A chasse-marée, a peculiar species of vessel, used only in the coasting trade, was to be fitted up and manned with young probationers of the navy, equivalent to our midshipmen. This, it was thought, might elude the vigilance of such British cruisers as were in shore; but then it must have been a suspicious object at sea, and the possibility of its being able to make the voyage to America, was considered as precarious. A Danish corvette was next purchased, and as, in leaving the harbour, it was certain she would be brought to and examined by the English, a place of concealment was contrived, being a cask supplied with air-tubes, to be stowed in the hold of the vessel, in which it was intended Napoleon should lie concealed. But the extreme rigour with which the search was likely to be prosecuted, and the corpulence of Buonaparte, which would not permit him to remain long in a close or constrained position, made this as well as other hopeless contrivances be laid aside.[176] [Sidenote: PROPOSALS FROM THE ARMY.] There were undoubtedly at this time many proposals made to the Ex-Emperor by the army, who, compelled to retreat behind the Loire, were still animated by a thirst of revenge, and a sense of injured honour. There is no doubt that they would have received Napoleon with acclamation; but if he could not, or would not, pursue a course so desperate in 1814, when he had still a considerable army, and a respectable extent of territory remaining, it must have seemed much more ineligible in 1815, when his numbers were so much more disproportioned than they had formerly been, and when his best generals had embraced the cause of the Bourbons, or fled out of France. Napoleon's condition, had he embraced this alternative, would have been that of the chief of a roving tribe of warriors, struggling for existence, with equal misery to themselves and the countries through which they wandered, until at length broken down and destroyed by superior force.