Individual pseudojudgments--Their practical character--Genesis of the distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value; and critique of it--Importance of individual pseudojudgments--Empirical individual and individual abstract judgments--Formative process of empirical judgments--Their existential basis--Dependence of empirical judgments upon pure concepts--Empirical judgments as classification--Classification and understanding--Substitution of the one for the other, and genesis of perceptive and judicative illusions--Abstract concepts and individual judgments--Impossibility of direct application of the first to the second--Intervention of empirical judgments as intermediate--Reduction of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous--Empirical abstract judgments and enumeration (mensuration, etc.)--Enumeration and intelligence--The so-called conversion of quantity into quality--Mathematical space and time and their abstractness. THIRD SECTION IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL _A PRIORI_ SYNTHESIS I IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the individual judgment--Distinction between the two: truth of reason and truth of fact, necessary and contingent, etc.; formal and material--Absurdities arising from these distinctions: the individual judgment as ultra-logical; or, duality of logical forms--Difficulty of abandoning the distinction--The hypothesis of reciprocal implication, and so of the identity of the two forms--Objection; the lack of representative and historical element in the definitive--The historical element in the definitions taken in their concreteness--The definition as answer to a question and solution of a problem--Individual and historical conditionally of every question and problem--Definition as also historical judgment--Unity of truth of reason and truth of fact--Considerations in confirmation of this--Critique of the false distinction between formal and material truths--Platonic men and Aristotelian men--Theory of application of the concepts, true for abstract concepts and false for true concepts. II THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL SYNTHESIS The identity of the judgment of definition and of the individual judgment, as synthesis _a priori_--Objections to the synthesis _a priori,_ deriving from abstractionists and empiricists--False interpretation of the synthesis _a priori_--Synthesis _a priori in_ general and logical synthesis _a priori_--Non-logical synthesis _a priori--_The synthesis _a priori,_ as synthesis, not of opposites, but of distincts--The category in the judgment. Difference between category and innate idea--The synthesis _a priori,_ the destruction of transcendency, and the objectivity of knowing--Power of the synthesis _a priori_ remained unknown to its discoverer. III LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES