Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept — John Shaqi
Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
Were this so, the treatise which we are preparing to develop would
have no subject-matter whatever, and would here cease, since it is
impossible to seek out the nature of what does not exist, that is, of
the concept, or how it operates in relation to the other forms of the
Spirit. But that this is not so, and that the concept really exists
and operates and gives rise to problems, undoubtedly results from the
negation itself, pronounced by that form of scepticism which we will
call _logical,_ and which is, indeed, the only negation conceivable
upon this point. Thus, we can speedily reassure ourselves as to the
fate of our undertaking; or, if it be preferred, we must at once
abandon the hope which we conjured up before ourselves, and resign
ourselves to the labour of constructing a Logic; a labour which logical
scepticism, by restricting us to the sole form of representation, had,
as it seems, the good intention of sparing us.
[Sidenote: _Its three forms._]
Logical scepticism, in fact, can assume three forms. It may affirm
simply that representative knowledge is the whole and that unity or
universality, whose existence we have postulated, are words without
meaning. Or it may affirm that the demand for unity is justified, but
that it is satisfied only by the non-cognitive forms of the Spirit.
Or, finally, it may affirm that the demand is certainly satisfied by
these non-cognitive forms, but only in so far as they react upon
the cognitive, that is to say, upon the one admitted form of the
cognitive, namely, the representative. It is clear that there is no
other possibility beyond these three, either that of being satisfied
with representative knowledge; or of being satisfied with something
non-cognitive; or of combining these two forms. In the first case,
we have the theory of _æstheticism_ (which could also be correctly
called sensationalism, if this did not happen to be an inconvenient
term, by reason of the misunderstanding which might easily spring from
it); in the second, the theory of _mysticism;_ in the third, that of
_empiricism_ or _arbitrarism._
[Sidenote: _Æstheticism._]
According to æstheticism, in order to understand the real, it is not
necessary to think by means of concepts, to universalize, to reason, or
to be logical. It suffices to pass from one spectacle to another; and
the sum of these, increased to infinity, is the truth which we seek,
and which we must refrain from transcending, lest we fall into the
void. The _sub specie aeterni_ would be just like that mirror of water
which deceived the avidity of the dog of Phædrus, and made it leave the
real for the illusory food. For the cold and fruitless quest of the
logician there is substituted the rich and moving contemplation of the
artist. Truth lies in works of speech, of colour, of line, and not at
all in the vain babblings of philosophy. Let us sing, let us paint, and
not compel our minds to spasmodic and sterile efforts.
[Sidenote: _Mysticism._]
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