Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
In our day demands for a Philosophy of history are rare and received
with scant favour; but it seems that those for a Philosophy of nature
are again acquiring vigour. On seeking the inward meaning of this fact,
it is seen that on the one hand many of those who demand a Philosophy
of nature are empiricists, desirous of a natural science elaborated
into a philosophy, and therefore not properly of a Philosophy of
nature, but of a view of the natural sciences that may supplant
philosophy. Other upholders of a Philosophy of nature echo the only
programme of such a philosophy, as it was formulated especially by
Schelling and by Hegel, but declare themselves altogether dissatisfied
with the attempts to carry it out made by Schelling, by Hegel and by
the followers of both. They are dissatisfied, but incapable of setting
their dissatisfaction at rest by a new attempt at carrying out the
programme. They are also without the intellectual courage necessary
to question and to re--examine the solidity of the programme itself,
which is in their judgment plausible and guaranteed by such great
names. For what indeed is more plausible upon first inspection than
the affirmation that the empirical sciences must be elevated to the
rank of philosophy? It seems that too much mental liberty is needed
to understand and to distinguish from the preceding, the somewhat
different proposition that empiricism (empirical philosophy) must
certainly be elevated to the rank of non-empirical philosophy, but that
the _empirical sciences_ must be left in peace to their own methods,
without any attempt to render perfect by means of extrinsic additions
that which has in itself all the perfection of which it is capable.
It seems that more intelligence than is usually met with is necessary
in order to recognize that this last proposition does not establish a
_dualism_ of spirit and nature, of philosophy and the natural sciences,
but for ever destroys every dualism by making of the natural sciences
a merely practical formation of the spirit, which has no voice in
the assembly of the philosophical sciences, as the object which it
has created has no reality. An ultimate tendency can be discerned in
the complex movement of the day toward a Philosophy of nature. This
is the attainment of the consciousness that reality is on this side
of the classifications of the natural sciences, and that the natural
sciences must be retranslated into _history,_ by means of a historical
consideration (concrete and not abstract) of the facts that are called
natural. But this tendency is not something that will attain its end
in a near or in a distant future. It has always shown its value and
shows it also to-day; it can be recommended and promoted, but neither
more nor less than every other legitimate form of spiritual activity
can be recommended and promoted. Classifications are classifications;
and what man really seeks out, what continually enriches the empirical
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